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焦作翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：as the cost of compensation mechanisms and pricing policies (pricing and cost recovery principles, see Laffont & Tirole (1993)), they are also regulatory policy in the core content.Taking into account the mechanism of high excitation intensity (contract) will bring the information rent caused by the social costs, we can not generalize that is a good tool for high excitation intensity, or low excitation intensity tool is good. In some cases, cost sharing or profit-sharing mechanism with high excitation intensity regulation as important, this is worth pondering, especially for China. Although the essence of all countries regulatory reform and competition policy should be the same, but that does not deny the special system variables on the regulation may impact the design. Therefore, we must take full account of the institutional environment of regulatory tools to encourage the impact strength of selection. Different in different countries of the Western practice can prove it. Generally speaking, only a country's political endowments to guarantee such high excitation intensity the effective implementation of regulatory tools, such a system is the choice can be considered. In this respect the UK is an example, while China is too much intervention by the administration of justice, independence is not enough, the high excitation intensity of regulatory tools means that the regulator of the camera to act right great, the cost of buying such a regulation is very low . Specifically, in our regulatory framework, there are two principal - agent relationship: the public and regulatory agencies, regulatory agencies and enterprises. Here, the regulatory body is between a public and corporate "information intermediary" or "authorized oversight body," but the information advantage of these organizations is authorized to act on camera, monitoring body has the right reasons. On the one hand the information intermediary may not be sufficient incentives to collect the relevant industry technology and economics of information; the other hand, regulatory agencies may have different social welfare maximizing the objective function. Therefore, we must seriously consider the regulatory agencies and regulatory collusion between business problems. However, regulation is illegal to buy, regulatory agencies and regulated companies must consider the costs of collusion may be exposed, so they generally take between non-monetary transactions form of payment, which will more than pay the money directly to greater social costs. In China, due to social supervision mechanism is not perfect, buying behavior is difficult to find, or found it difficult
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